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This paper critically examines the issue of ‘inherited corporate social responsibility’ in the gold mining 
industry, focusing specifically on the case of sub-Saharan Africa, a region plagued with excessive 
corruption, rampant poverty and weak governance. Whilst there appears to be little incentive to 
proactively engage with communities and implement cutting-edge environmental policies in the region, 
mine managers argue otherwise, highlighting a number of reasons for embracing corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). After briefly reviewing the philosophical underpinnings of CSR, the paper provides 
an in-depth analysis of these arguments, in the process, underscoring how tenuous the case for CSR in 
the extractive industries, and gold mining more specifically, is in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Following a change in ownership, new management faces few pressures to embrace CSR in its entirety 
and therefore, more often than not, finds itself in a position to implement programs and policies of its 
choice. More research is needed that further popularizes the issue of ‘inherited CSR’ in the gold mining 
sector and extractive industries more generally.  
 





The aim of this paper is to bring to light the issue of 
‘inherited corporate social responsibility’ at gold mines. 
Over the past two decades, corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) has been heavily popularized in the gold 
mining industry, its managers and CEOs arguing that firm 
commitments to stewardship and environmental 
protection are keys to maximizing the profitability of 
projects. In addition to proponents contesting that there is 
a business case for CSR in the sector, it is often argued 
that gold mining companies must secure a ‘social license 
to operate’; and, because they can be held accountable 
by catchment communities, regulators and NGOs, that 
companies have strong incentive to embrace CSR to its 
fullest.  
But what happens when a company takes over a gold 
mine whose management has made firm commitments to 
community development and environmental protection? 
This phenomenon – referred to here as ‘inherited CSR’ – 
has received very little attention in the literature, let alone 
in the context of gold mining, an industry in which 
changes in ownership occur frequently. In recent years, 
criticisms of gold mining companies’ environmental and 
social performance have mounted (EARTHWORKS, 
2003; Lange, 2006; Pegg, 2003, 2006) but few analyses 
have taken stock of the industry’s dynamic managerial 
structure and the impacts a change in mine ownership 
can have on CSR. This applies to sub-Saharan Africa, a 
region where corruption is rampant, fiscal transparency is 
low and, despite what may be said otherwise, the 
pressure to embrace the concerns of communities is 
virtually nonexistent. Much in the way that extant 
contracts with workers tend not to be honoured, suppliers 
are changed and production facilities are closed following 
the arrival of new management at a gold mine, 
commitments to community and CSR programs can also 
be sidelined.  
In order to appreciate what impact a change in 
ownership may have on local people, it is imperative to 
first revisit the  arguments   on   which   the  case   for   
CSR   in  the extractive industries – and  the  gold  mining 




sector more specifically – has been built. As will be 
explained although mining companies have been at the 
forefront of the debate on CSR, its CEOs championing its 
importance in ‘accessing’ economic deposits and pre-
serving shareholder value, there is little evidence to 
support the general arguments on which the industry’s 
case is based. These arguments are most tenuous in the 
case of sub-Saharan Africa, where again, governance 
and accountability is lacking: there appears to be very 
little incentive to engage in CSR at gold mines in 
developing countries overall, and very little proof that 
doing so provides any financial advantage.  
The paper focuses on the issue of ‘inherited’ 
commitment itself. First, it reviews some of the recent 
major changes in ownership that have taken place in the 
gold mining industry which have potentially had a bearing 
on CSR outcomes at projects in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
paper then draws upon experiences from Ghana to 
illustrate how easily commitments to the environment and 
communities can be sidelined, even in situations where 
there is a legacy of CSR. The case of Ghana reveals 
that, in a business climate devoid of pressures to perform 
responsibly, there is no single ‘best’ CSR strategy. 
Rather, gold mining companies are at liberty to decide 
which path to follow because as is shown, markedly 
different approaches can yield equally positive financial 
outcomes. The ability of companies to implement 
radically different programs to those which they ‘inherit’ 
discredits further the anecdotal arguments on which the 
case for CSR in the gold mining industry has been built.    
 
 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR): A 
CRITICAL OVERVIEW 
 
Critical analyses of ‘corporate social responsibility’ first 
surfaced in the academic literature in the 1970s, in what 
is widely regarded as the ‘environmental decade’. A 
global conservation movement that had galvanized 
towards the late-1960s would trigger a mass overhaul of 
environmental legislation, initially in North America, and 
subsequently, in Europe (Dunlap and Mertig, 1991). The 
changes exposed many companies’ polluting practices; 
magnified how little industry was doing to prevent 
contamination of environmental media; and even 
revealed the extent to which some corporations were 
contributing to environmental problems, most notably, 
acid rain and ozone depletion. To ensure compliance with 
newly-implemented environmental legislation and avoid 
costly fines, companies were forced to spend tens of 
millions of dollars to replace polluting production 
processes and install new technologies. The sweeping 
changes made to laws mobilized unions and the media, 
which began pressuring companies to become ‘more 
responsible citizens’ within the localities where they 
operated.  





corporations, which had hitherto grown accustomed to 
operating with minimal regulatory pressure. For most, the 
idea of being responsible stewards seemed alien, 
contradicting the very modus operandi of doing business. 
As explained by Ostlund (1977) at the time, ‘in reaction to 
pressures on all fronts, corporations are being called 
upon to direct attention and resources to social problems 
far removed from their central economic mission... – 
demands (which) are vague, even though forceful, and 
conflicting even though worthy’. Bowman and Haire 
(1975) elaborated further on what management clearly 
perceived to be a huge challenge and potentially, an 
impediment: 
 
‘It has become an increasingly perplexing problem for 
corporate strategists to find an appropriate posture for 
what may be called corporate citizenship or social 
responsibility. Among the things that make it difficult are 
two prevalent myths: the activities in this area are in 
fundamental conflict with the interests of the investor, and 
that resources committed to such activities come, net, out 
of the equity holder’s pocket; and that the motivation for 
such activities lies only in a sense of noblesse oblige on 
the part of the group formulating the strategy, and again, 
is an interest not directly related to the equity holder’s 
welfare’.  
 
As discussions on ‘corporate stewardship’, ‘pollution 
prevention’ and ‘corporate responsibility’ intensified, the 
social and environmental performance of companies, 
particularly those which struggled to meet newly-
implemented standards and/or openly resisted the 
growing demands of communities, began to attract media 
spotlight. Confusion over how to cope with growing 
societal expectations permeated all levels of operation. A 
wave of studies on CSR undertaken in the 1970s (Carroll 
1974, 1978; Holmes, 1976; Shanklin, 1976) captured this, 
underscoring the difficulties executives were having with 
industry assuming a stewardship role. 
Yet, what seemed unfathomable four decades ago has 
since become a reality. Today, CSR is the focal point of 
most multinationals’ core business strategies, and is 
often the featured theme on their internet homepages. So 
called ‘leading-edge’ companies now have in place 
programs that address environmental and social issues 
fairly comprehensively. In fact, corporations have become 
so well equipped for managing mounting concerns about 
the environment and communities that some scholars 
(Chen et al., 2008; Gifford et al., 2010) have portrayed 
them as philanthropic and charitable entities; many have 
even labelled particular firms ‘good stewards’ and ‘good 
citizens’. ‘Strategic CSR’, however, has become the 
preferred approach of businesses today simply because 
of the view that it yields ‘substantial business-related 
benefits to the firm, in particular by supporting core 
business   activities   and  thus  contributing to  the  firm’s 
effectiveness   in   accomplishing   its  mission   [of   profit 




Table 1. Selected mining sector reform project implemented in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 




Burkina Faso Mining Sector Capacity Building and Environmental Management project 1997 21.4 
    
Ghana Natural Resources and Environmental Governance First Development Policy 
Operation 
2008 20 
    
Mozambique Mineral Resources Management Capacity Building Project 2001 18 
Nigeria Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project 2004 120 




maximization]’ (Burke and Logsdon, 1996). Few Indus-
tries have embraced CSR as comprehensively – at least 
on paper – as mining, which operates in some of the 
most ecologically and culturally-sensitive environments 
across the world. The largest mining companies have 
relied heavily on CSR dialogue to facilitate access to 
such places.  
In order to become what Burke and Logsdon (1996) 
classify as ‘more strategic’, firms must first establish 
divisions capable of managing, relatively autonomously, 
environmental and interrelated social concerns. In the 
mining industry, this task has been, and continues to be, 
herculean: persuading sceptics to dismiss a series of 
socially and environmentally destructive incidents. 
Notable examples include civil conflict in Bougainville 
Papua New Guinea, sparked by community grievances 
over mining; the environmental destruction caused by the 
Australian company, BHP Billiton, at Ok Tedi in Papua 
New Guinea; and mounting complications with commu-
nities based around Newmont’s Yanococha Mine in Peru. 
The challenge has been persuading the Indus-try’s 
harshest critics and a sceptical public that environmental 
and social concerns are now being addressed far more 
comprehensively – that management is now fully 
committed to ‘not only its shareholders, but also to other 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, affected 
communities and the general public, on issues such as 
human rights, employee welfare and climate change’ 
(Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006). Mining companies, 
therefore, have established departments to handle CSR-
related issues. Most are staffed with a range of experts, 
including anthropologists, economists, environmental 
specialists and engineers. These units have helped to 
mitigate against actions taken by NGOs, as well as 
lobbying indigenous groups, which, as Kapelus (2002) 
explains, have ‘increased their organizational capacity 
and cooperation tremendously over the last twenty years 
or so’.  
The establishment of departments capable of buffering 
against such resistance has also helped the mining 
sector expand into developing countries. In the 1990s, 
the World Bank began scaling up support for programs 
emphasizing mining-led growth in the developing world, 
particularly across  sub-Saharan  Africa.  In  its  landmark 
report, A Strategy for African Mining (World Bank, 1992), 
a comprehensive blueprint for growth was outlined. It 
emphasizes a model of export-led development, calling 
on African leaders to overhaul national mining legislation 
to provide generous investment incentives for prospective 
mining and mineral exploration companies, privatize mine 
parastatals, and reduce government intervention in the 
sector. A wave of World Bank mining sector reform 
programs have since been implemented (Table 1). The 
changes these spawned proved instrumental in securing 
investment from international mining houses such as 
Barrick Gold, Newmont Gold Mining, Rio Tinto and 
Golden Star Resources, which now operate numerous 
projects across sub-Saharan Africa. The CSR depart-
ments of these, and other, major mine operators, have 
helped to deflect criticism from NGOs; their entry and/or 
expansion in the region has been facilitated in part by 
renewed commitments to community development and 
environmental protection. 
Central to accomplishing this has been a crucial 
second change: namely a pledge to putting the 
‘community’ at the heart of CSR dialogue, programs and 
policy. For decades, across the developed world, com-
panies profited substantially from operating unsafe, low-
cost polluting activities that provided catchment 
communities with few economic benefits. But increased 
awareness of these impacts in media circles and the 
general public, along with heighted regulatory pressure, 
has since made the establishment of regular dialogue 
with, and the awarding of compensation to, communities, 
virtually mandatory in Europe and North America: the 
literature on CSR is now ‘permeated with references to 
how corporations perceive themselves to be part of the 
community’ (Kapleus, 2002). For the mining industry, 
forging cordial relations with communities – or at least 
conveying the impression that community concerns are 
being addressed more proactively – is of paramount 
importance because activities are often established in 
areas populated by subsistence indigenous groups. As 
Jenkins and Yakvoleva (2006) explain, ‘though tradi-
tionally seen as a potential impediment to development, 
with the globalization of opposition to mining develop-
ments and the emancipation of indigenous rights, 
engagement   with    aboriginal  groups   has   become   a  




reputational and political imperative for mining com-
panies’. Firms operating in Australia, for example, have 
had little choice but to establish dialogue with the 
aborigines inhabiting remote areas containing coveted 
gold deposits (Young, 1992; O'Faircheallaigh, 2006). 
Companies operating in areas of Canada and the United 
States inhabited by First Nations groups have had to do 
the same (O'Faircheallaigh, 2010; Weitzner 2010).   
A third strand of strategic CSR is proactive reporting. 
Over the past two decades, there has been growing 
emphasis placed by the management of multinationals on 
detailing industrial activities, highlighting actions under-
taken to establish positive relations with communities, 
and disclosing details about corporate-sponsored com-
munity development activities. This information has been 
disseminated in CSR reports and on company web 
pages. It is often argued that through reporting, the 
management of multinationals demonstrate a high level 
of commitment to transparency and to informing wider 
audiences of the activities being undertaken to support 
affected communities.  
Increased documentation of CSR activities in corporate 
media has spawned a literature on ‘corporate citizenship’. 
Most of the earliest pieces on this topic contest that profit 
maximization and community development go hand-in-
hand. Many of the more recent discussions on ‘corporate 
citizenship’ (Warhurst, 2001), however, appear far 
removed from the reality that ‘corporate social responsi-
bility is not without limits’ and how ‘the manager cannot 
“give away the store”’ (Byron, 1982). The impression 
conveyed by this relatively uncritical body of analysis is 
that the very corporations which, inter alia, once polluted 
rivers freely and contributed minimally to the very 
communities where they operated have morphed into 
philanthropic organizations. Such glorification and 
misrepresentation of CSR often deludes societal groups, 
many of which now also mistakenly view corporations as 
charities and therefore place unrealistic demands on their 
management.  
This is a potential problem in the large-scale gold 
mining industry, which is expanding rapidly across the 
world, propelled by record high gold prices. The 
unprecedented growth in gold mining and exploration that 
has occurred over the past two decades in sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular – a region characterized by weak 
governance, high levels of corruption, and persistent and 
endemic poverty – is a concern, or at least should be. In 
implementing the formula prescribed for large-scale, 
export-driven mining growth in A Strategy for African 
Mining, many of the region’s governments have 
established relatively easy routes of entry for hundreds of 
foreign gold mining and mineral exploration companies. 
But with few exceptions, catchment communities have 
derived few benefits from incoming activity (Pegg, 2006). 
This has led to the industry attracting even more 
unwanted criticism. To their credit, most have implemen-
ted community development programs that aim to service 





mining projects have been established. How effective 
have these moves been? More importantly, are the 
companies operating in sub-Saharan Africa genuinely 
committed to putting communities at the heart of corpo-
rate strategy? These issues require further investigation. 
Gold mining now flourishes in some of the region’s most 
corrupt countries where, despite there being few incen-
tives and pressures to embrace community concerns, 
international mining houses have indicated that they have 
launched social development programs.  
Increased reportage by both CSR departments and 
NGOs on Africa’s mining growth has failed to yield much 
insight on the impact of these programs, however; in fact, 
it has painted an even more convoluted picture of what is 
happening on the ground. For example, critics have 
condemned the large-scale displacement – of over 9000 
farmers – that occurred during the first phase of operation 
at Newmont’s Ahafo Mine in Ghana. In particular, the 
NGO, OICI, which was contracted by the company to 
identify ways to empower the displaced, has been heavily 
criticized for pushing people into what appears to be 
inappropriate alternative livelihoods, including snail-
rearing and soap-making.1 
 The company, on the other hand, has published, on its 
website, images of what appear to be satisfied resettled 
farmers, the activities taken to empower them falling 
under the very neutral-sounding banner ‘Livelihood 
Restoration and Improvement Programs’, now the centre-
piece of the project’s community development program. 
Toronto-based Barrick Gold is another company that has 
attracted significant criticism over its activities in sub-
Saharan Africa. In particular, it has been accused of 
contributing very little, economically, to the communities 
based around its four operating mines in Tanzania – 
North Mara, Bulyanhulu, Tulawaka and Buzwagi. Yet, the 
picture painted on the company’s website and in its 
annual reports is that it is facilitating significant develop-
ment in these communities by providing roads, health 
infrastructure, schools and economic activities.2  
This paper does not seek to challenge the claims being 
made in the area of CSR by multinational gold mining 
companies operating in sub-Saharan Africa. It rather 
aims to raise awareness of the fragility of these pledges. 
Again, most CSR project work is being carried out in 
countries characterized by weak governance, and is 
being implemented directly in localities inhabited by 
subsistence populations that have minimal exposure to 
the ‘wage economy’ and where, at times, monitoring is 
low and regulations are rarely enforced. The paper 
focuses specifically on cases where the ownership of 
projects has changed. The critical question in such 
instances is: have the initial pledges made to community 
development by the original managerial staff been upheld 
  
                                                            
1
 See www.bicusa.org/en/Project.Concerns.23.aspx (Accessed 4 March 2010). 
2
 See www.barrick.com/CorporateResponsibility/OurCommitment/default.aspx 




by the new regime? The issue of ‘inherited responsibility’ 
or ‘inherited CSR policy’ has been overlooked in the 
extractive industries, particularly in the context of gold 
mining in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 
GOLD MINING INDUSTRY: A FLAWED DISCOURSE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
 
Why would managers of large-scale gold mining 
companies consider prioritizing CSR at their projects in 
the developing world, particularly operations in sub-
Saharan Africa? As will be explained in this section of the 
paper, many of the arguments tabled in support of CSR – 
specifically, the reasons most commonly cited as 
explanations for why companies would view community 
and environmental concerns more strategically – do not 
apply completely to mining. The fragility of arguments on 
which the case for CSR in the industry is based is cause 
for concern, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
changes in ownership of projects are frequent and often 
unpredictable. 
In exploring this issue further, the discussion that 
follows draws attention to points raised in Hamann’s 
(2003) sympathetic critique of CSR in the mining sector. 
The author examines a number of issues in an attempt to 
refute Milton Friedman’s claim that ‘few trends could so 
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our society 
as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social 
responsibility other than to make as much money for their 
stockholders as possible’. Many of the points which 
Hamann (2003) raises, however, are the very reasons 
why the case made for CSR in the mining sector – at 
least in the context of large-scale gold extraction in sub-
Saharan Africa – is so tenuous.  
 
 
The business case 
 
Hamann (2003) contests that there is a strong business 
case for CSR in the mining industry – that it ‘is good for 
profits’. For over two decades, the business case has 
featured at the heart of the CSR debate, popularized by 
industry itself. It is premised upon the idea that growing 
societal expectations of businesses to perform at high 
levels environmentally and socially require management 
to think more strategically about operations, and to be 
ever-responsive to changing consumer demands. The 
specific message being preached by a growing number 
of CEOs is that ‘CSR can be a proactive business 
strategy and an effective marketing tool to create and 
sustain a competitive advantage’, and that in order ‘to 
survive and compete in the hyper-competitive global 
market, they (companies) must evolve from ‘‘doing good’’ 
to ‘‘doing better’’ and may be to ‘‘doing best’’ by building 
added societal value’ (Lin et al., 2009). The business 
case for CSR is built  upon  the  following  hypotheses: 1)  




that it (CSR) can improve a company’s image and 
reputation; 2) that ‘cutting-edge’ performance impacts 
positively on employee motivation, retention and 
recruitment; 3) that embracing it can lead to cost savings 
through increased efficiency and time savings due to a 
higher sensitivity of investors to sustainability issues; 4) 
that it can facilitate revenue increases through higher 
sales and market share; and 5) that it can reduce risks 
(Weber, 2008).  
But to what extent do these issues apply to gold mining 
companies, particularly those operating in sub-Saharan 
Africa? Hamann (2003) argues that there is indeed a 
business case for CSR in the mining sector, which its 
senior management believes ‘play(s) a crucial role in the 
economic and competitive strength of a mine’. The three 
main points the author raises in support the business 
case for CSR in mining, however, all centre on the role of 
customers, whose influence in primary sector production 
on the whole is minimal at best.3 The insinuation made is 
that in the mining sector, the link between production and 
consumption is linear, much like multinational firms which 
deliver products directly to market, such as Nike and 
Nestle. This, however, is far from being the case. In the 
latter cases, a boycott in the West against perceived 
‘unfair’ and ‘inhumane’ practices at a plant in Asia, for 
example, could adversely impact sales in shops located 
along North American and European high streets, which 
would necessitate a radical change in corporate strategy. 
Conversely, such opposition in the gold mining sector, 
which supplies manufacturers as opposed to servicing 
consumers directly, would have minimal impact. The 
groundswell for change in the case of the extractive 
industries must, therefore, take place at the locations of 
operations themselves. 
In support of the business case for CSR in mining, 
Hamann (2003) points out that ‘customers of raw 
materials are becoming more and more concerned about 
the production conditions of the raw materials and 
increasingly demand certification... [and] social sustain-
ability standards’. There is little disputing that the recent 
euphoria in policymaking and donor circles over issues 
such as climate change, renewable energy, destruction of 
rainforests and land degradation in developing countries 
has further galvanized environmentally-conscious 
Western consumers. In the United States, for example, 
surveys show that since the early 1990s, 94 percent of 
the population has made an effort to buy environmentally-
friendly products and that nearly 90 percent are now 
willing to pay more for such products (Massoud et al., 
2010). One way that companies have attempted to 
appease such growing environmental concern is through 
voluntary codes and programs, which, proponents   
argue,    can    benefit    a   business   economically  if  its  
                                                            
3
 The gold mining industry does not interact with everyday consumers directly. 
The process of producing gold comprises prospecting for ore, accessing that 
ore, removing and transporting economic minerals to plants for chemical 
and/or biological treatment, processing and refining.  




customers value environmental protection and are willing 
to pay more for the goods and services produced by 
businesses perceived to be environmentally friendly or to 
buy more of those goods and services’ (Borck and 
Conglianese, 2009). Hamann (2003) singles out the ISO 
14001 standard, the most popular certification for an 
environmental management system (EMS)4 and which, 
over the past two decades, has become the emblem of 
‘green’ manufacturing and production. But for gold mining 
companies, which again, do not interact directly with 
consumers, what benefit would having in place an ISO 
14001-certified EMS provide? The sluggish pace at which 
the industry has pursued certification vis-à-vis other 
sectors is a telling sign of the perceived utility of the 
standards in the industry. It is important to clarify that 
most mines do have an EMS in place, not to appease a 
concerned public but rather because it ‘allows 
organizations to be systematic in the evaluation of their 
processes and activities with regard to interaction with 
the environment’ (Massoud et al., 2010).  
Another motivation behind adoption of voluntary 
standards such as ISO 14001 is, as Borck and 
Coglianese (2009) explain, that they can potentially help 
firms ‘discover various ways to reduce their production or 
operating costs by using resources more efficiently or 
otherwise redesigning their business processes to be 
more environmentally benign’. In the mining sector, 
however, extensive planning and cost-benefit analysis 
takes place long before the construction of a mine can 
even be considered, which is why today, close to 80 
percent of gold mining activity takes place in the 
developing world, much of it in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Gifford et al., 2010): since 1990, national mining legisla-
tion has been overhauled or reworked in 78 percent of 
the region’s countries (Reichardt, 2009), a lowering of 
standards aimed primarily at attracting foreign investment 
to stimulate gold exploration and extraction. In short, the 
mine management of multinational gold mining com-
panies recognize the economic advantages of operating 
in sub-Saharan Africa; they have a detailed budget firmly 
in place long before the project is opened. Assuming that 
the management of billion dollar investments could 
suddenly ‘realize’ additional cost savings with the 
implementation of voluntary codes of practice such as the 
ISO 14001 standards would, therefore, be overly naive. 
 
 
                                                            
4
 An EMS is the component of the overall management system that includes 
organizational procedures, environmental responsibilities, and processes, helps 
an industry comply with environmental regulations, identify technical and 
economic benefits, and ensures that environmental policies are adopted and 
followed (Barrow, 1999). It enables management to systematically ‘manage’ 
environmental impacts and facilitate improvement by helping to identify 
potential problems, set appropriate objectives, establish programs to achieve 
corporate environmental goals, and review activities to ensure that corporate 
environmental policy objectives are being properly carried out (Bergeron, 
1997). ISO 14001 is the most recognized EMS certification worldwide; a 






The two additional points raised by Hamann (2003) in 
support of the business case for CSR in mining go hand-
in-hand. First, the author contests that it is in the interest 
of mine management to maintain cordial relations with 
catchment communities in order to avoid ‘local commu-
nity opposition, ranging from protest to sabotage’, which, 
it is argued ‘can cause costly delays in production or 
even termination of production’. But whilst strained 
relations with local villages could certainly lead to 
premature mine closure, there is no evidence to suggest 
that a fear of community backlash would motivate 
management to pursue best practices during the course 
of operation. This is perhaps best illustrated by the case 
of the Niger Delta in Nigeria, where Royal Dutch Shell 
has had a presence since the late 1930s. The strategies 
used by the company to drill for oil in Ogoni land in Rivers 
State, where, as Frynas (1998) explains, between 1958 
and 1990, it operated close to 100 wells, has, over the 
years, attracted criticism from even the staunchest 
supporters of CSR. During this period, the company, 
which accounts for 40 percent of Nigeria’s oil production 
(Ite, 2007), only invested an estimated 0.000007 percent 
of its oil revenues into Ogoni land itself (Frynas, 1998). 
The Ogonis, a minority group of roughly 500,000 people, 
have long protested over the lack of development in the 
Delta, in the process, mobilizing other ethnic groups in 
the country that have also been adversely affected by oil 
production. Until only recently, Shell had managed to 
operate under a guise of ‘responsible activity’, without 
having any comprehensive CSR program in place: rather 
than finance the implementation of basic services such 
as electricity and piped-borne water, the company 
elected to invest in ‘many non-functioning white ele-
phants, including unfinished buildings designed to be 
health clinics or schools, water projects where the water 
was unfit for consumption, or projects such as health 
clinics which lacked light, running water, basic equipment 
or staff’ (Frynas, 2005). Community grievances over a 
lack of downstream development have escalated to the 
point where the people of the Niger Delta are now 
militant, regularly sabotaging oil pipes and hijacking 
workers to extort monies. Towards the mid-1990s, senior 
management at not only Shell but at most of Nigeria’s 
principal oil operations began to express concern over 
lost working days due to community disturbances. These 
concerns, however, proved unfounded: despite growing 
militancy, oil production in Nigeria actually increased 
toward the end of the decade. 
Whilst perhaps an extreme case, the experience of 
Shell in the Niger Delta does nevertheless provide evi-
dence that primary sector companies can maximize 
profitability without engaging in any meaningful CSR. If 
Hamann’s (2003) argument that ‘production delays are 
particularly problematic in the context of increasingly 
demanding customers in just-in-time supply chains’ 
applied in the extractive industries in developing coun-
tries, Shell would never have been able to work in the 




mining: what is often overlooked in analyses that link 
community backlash to costly disruption and/or expedited 
closure is how, much like Shell in the Delta, in many 
cases, profit has been maximized over the short and 
medium-term by disregarding environment and com-
munity development issues entirely. Consider, for 
example, the environmental disaster that occurred at the 
Ok Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea (Kirsch, 2002; 
Banks, 2008). The mine, which up until only recently, was 
majority owned by BHP Billiton, commenced operation in 
1984, following intensive exploration activity throughout 
the 1970s. Shortly after opening, however, the mine’s 
tailings dam ruptured, which management opted not to 
fix. A steady stream of contaminated waste tailings 
contained in the pond soon began to seep into the Fly 
River System; discharges of toxic tailings were estimated 
to be in the range of 80,000 m3 daily. Ecosystems 
became contaminated, and the fishing grounds and 
agricultural lands of the 50,000 people residing in the 120 
villages downstream from the project were destroyed. 
Following years of campaigning and lobbying, including 
visits made by representatives of local communities to 
The Hague and the US, BHP Billiton agreed to award 
US$ 28.6 million in compensation in an out-of-court 
settlement. The company has since sold most of its 
shares in the mine, which is scheduled to close in 2012. 
The payout it has made and its potentially-expedited 
closure are often used to illustrate how mining companies 
could be adversely impacted economically if they fail to 
address community concerns proactively. But what often 
goes overlooked in the case of Ok Tedi is the amount of 
profits BHP Billiton managed to earn by continuing to 
operate without addressing the damage: in the early 
1990s, the mine was generating in excess of US$ 50 
million in profits annually.5 
Another illustrative example of a mine that has thrived 
despite mounting community opposition is Newmont’s 
Yanacocha project in Peru, one of the Colorado-head-
quartered company’s most profitable operations. As 
explained by Sarin et al. (2006), community resistance 
toward the project has intensified particularly in the past 
decade, sparked initially by a slow response to an 
environmental disaster on-site. In June 2000, one of the 
mine’s contractors spilled 150 kg of toxic mercury, a 
product of the local geology. Over 1000 people were 
reportedly affected, suffering from a range of health-
related complications. Tensions have since escalated, 
largely over a perceived lack of local economic 
development: critics point to how Newmont, with support 
from the International Finance Corporation, has extracted 
US$ 7 billion in gold at Yanacocha since starting opera-
tions in the early 1990s (Perlez et al., 2005) but that the 
low negotiated royalty rate of 3 percent has meant that 
the government has received a paltry share of these 
winnings, calculated to be less than US$ 125 million in 
the   period  2000  to  2004  (Briggs,  2005).  Yet,  despite 
                                                            
5http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/6633 (Accessed 15 April 2010). 




staunch community resistance over what is seen by 
many critics as a questionable CSR and local economic 
development strategy, the company has managed to 
maintain and occasionally increase production levels over 
the past decade: during the same period (2000 to 2004), 
a peak period of community protest, annual gold mine 
production nearly doubled from 1,795,398 to 3,017,302 
oz. There are many other cases of mines operating in 
developing countries thriving economically in the face of 
mounting community opposition over low levels of 
economic development and/or management’s disregard 
of environmental issues. The exhaustive list includes the 
Marlin Mine in Guatemala, the Kumtor gold mine in 
Kyrgyztan, and the Omai Mine in Guyana 
(EARTHWORKS, 2003; IHRC, 2007; Fulmer et al., 
2008). 
This leads to the second point raised by Hamann 
(2003), which is the idea that a mining company requires 
a ‘social license to operate’ – that companies need to ‘win 
over’ the governments of the countries where manage-
ment is looking to expand, and in particular, the local 
populations residing within the catchment areas of 
activities, by demonstrating a high level of commitment to 
socio-economic development and environmental protec-
tion. The author argues that ‘good community relations 
are crucial for a company’s reputation, which, in turn, is 
vital to the company’s access to financial resources, 
government permits and highly qualified and motivated 
staff’. Does the gold mining companies that have targeted 
sub-Saharan Africa as a destination for operation have to 
secure a ‘social license to operate’? 
 
 
Securing a ‘social license to operate’ in Africa’s gold 
mining sector 
 
It has become fashionable in recent years, particularly 
among scholars who argue that critics of big business 
overhype the influence of companies, to argue that 
multinational corporations need to gain the acceptance of 
the communities inhabiting the areas where they are 
proposing to operate. This has led to the coining of the 
phrase ‘social license to operate’, the idea that firms must 
earn a ‘permit’ that ‘is based not on compliance with legal 
requirements (although, breach of these requirements 
may jeopardize the social license), but rather upon the 
degree to which a corporations and its activities are 
accepted by local communities, the wider society and 
various constituent groups’ (Gunningham et al., 2002). 
The phrase has been heavily popularized in industry 
circles and, along with CSR, has been integrated into the 
curricula of the world’s leading business schools. 
Surprisingly, despite numerous claims of its validity in 
corporate and internet media, a ‘social license to operate’ 
has been the subject of very little empirical investigation. 
It is clear, however, from what little information is 
available, that several questionable hypotheses underpin 
the idea  of  the  social  license.  One  major  assumption 




being made in the case of the gold mining sector is that 
the preservation of international reputation is a priority 
concern of senior management. The logic behind doing 
whatever is deemed necessary to appease catchment 
communities, receiving their endorsement and ultimately, 
securing a ‘social license to operate’ is that it minimizes 
the possibility of complications arising when attempts are 
made to move into other countries. One of the first 
companies to broach the idea was Newmont: 
 
‘In the past, a Newmont mine manager was concerned 
strictly with operational issues, getting the ore out of the 
ground. Today the manager must be able to interact with 
the community and generate the consent of the people in 
order to move the operation forward in a stable environ-
ment. For this reason, Newmont has developed what it 
calls “The Social License to Operate.” The social license 
is intangible, renewable daily and granted by the people 
only when their needs are being met...We must con-
stantly remind ourselves that we are guests in these 
countries and communities and must therefore prove 
ourselves on a continuing basis’.6 
 
But if the argument applied, Newmont, which has a 
lengthy track record of community-level complications at 
not only its Yanacocha project in Peru but also in Buyat 
Bay, Indonesia, would never have been ‘permitted’ to 
open mines in Ghana, where even its staff has admitted it 
is hoping to ‘get things right’. Whilst the company may 
indeed be doing this, the fact remains that there was no 
evidence at the time to suggest that it would commit to 
doing so. A more illustrative example is BHP Billion, 
whose management also emphasizes the importance of 
a ‘social license’, noting that it ‘depends on the respon-
sible operation of all aspects of our business, including 
our ability to work effectively with the communities in 
which we operate’ (BHP, 2007). Again, if the argument 
applied, the company, whose experience at Ok Tedi, 
claims Hamann (2003), ‘has [had] direct and potentially 
far-reaching impacts on project and company compete-
tiveness’, would not have been able to open its Ekati 
diamond mine in Northern Canada with such ease. 
The second assumption being made by proponents of 
the ‘social license’ is that communities are capable of 
holding multinational corporations – in this case, gold 
mining companies – accountable. In fact, the issue of 
community accountability resonates in the small amount 
of literature that has been produced on the topic to date. 
As Gunningham et al. (2004) explain, ‘corporate execu-
tives increasingly talk about the importance of operating 
in accordance with their “social license,” meaning that 
they are constrained to meet the expectations of society 
and avoid activities that societies (or influential elements 
within them) deem unacceptable’.  
                                                            
6www.ucdenver.edu/academics/InternationalPrograms/CIBER/GlobalForumRe






Proponents of the ‘social license’ in the gold mining 
sector seem to overlook the fact that landscapes are 
markedly different in the developed and developing 
worlds. In describing how the ‘social license’ applies to 
mining, Sheppard (2008) contests that a company is held 
in check by a range of community-level actors, including 
tribes, NGOs and agencies. Most of the cases cited in the 
literature in support of the ‘social license to operate’ 
argument, however, are from developed countries, where 
corporations can be held accountable. Key examples 
include the Brent Spar incident in the North Sea, 
Monstanto’s failure to respond to the concerns of Euro-
pean consumers about the introduction of genetically 
modified crops, and Nike’s perceived exploitation by 
Western consumers of labour in developing countries 
(Gunningham et al., 2004).  
But as explained further, the political landscape is 
much different in sub-Saharan Africa, where transactions 
are made directly with governments that rarely hold 
corporations accountable. The argument that a gold 
mining company must secure a ‘social license to operate’ 
is, at least in the case of in sub-Saharan Africa, anecdotal 





In addition to arguing that a business case and ‘social 
license to operate’ make CSR a necessary undertaking in 
the mining industry, Hamann (2003) contests that 
because ‘companies are increasingly held to account for 
more indirect and cumulative impacts of their actions’, 
there is a need for the industry to address environmental 
and social concerns more proactively. But who holds gold 
mining companies accountable in sub-Saharan Africa? 
More generally, who is responsible for regulating the 
sector in this region, where again, at times, enforcement 
is nonexistent? 
Sub-Saharan Africa is widely considered to be the most 
repressive region of the world. On its latest Index of 
Economic Freedom world rankings of 179 countries,7 
Freedom House classified eighteen of its economies as 
‘repressed’, reporting that its ‘overall level of economic 
freedom is weaker than that of any other region’ and that 
‘Sub-Saharan Africa is ranked last in seven of the 10 
components of economic freedom and performs espe-
cially poorly in terms of property rights and freedom from 
corruption’.8 The region’s oil producers are by far its most 
repressive nations; most of the presidents currently in 
office in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and 
Angola, rose to power in the 1970s and 1980s.  Its  major 
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 Since 1995, The Heritage Foundation, a Washington DC-based think tank, 
has measured economic freedom across the world with its Index of Economic 
Freedom. As noted on its website (www.heritage.org), the Index covers 10 
freedoms, ranging from property rights to entrepreneurship.  
8
‘Press Release: Sub-Saharan Africa’, 
 http://www.heritage.org/index/pressreleases/2010/2010-Index-Sub-Saharan-




gold producers, however, do not lag far behind. With the 
exceptions of South Africa and Ghana, which ranked 72nd 
and 87th, respectively, on the latest Index of Economic 
Freedom and falling into the category of ‘moderately 
free’, all of the region’s major and prospective gold 
producers are considered ‘mostly unfree’: Burkina Faso 
(92nd), Tanzania (97th), Mali (112th), Guinea (134th), Sierra 
Leone (157th) and Liberia (163rd). 
In addition to being repressive, sub-Saharan Africa is 
widely regarded to be the most corrupt region in the 
world. According to transparency international’s latest 
Corruptions Perception Index,9 ‘corruption is perceived as 
rampant..., perceived as a serious challenge by country 
experts and businessmen... [and that] the overall picture 
remains one of serious corruption challenges across the 
region’ (Transparency International, 2009). Perceived 
corruption is greatest in the region’s petro-states but its 
gold producers are not far off: Ghana, 69th; Burkina Faso, 
79th; Mali, 111th; Tanzania, 126th; Uganda, 130th; and 
Guinea, 160th. It appears that conditions are even 
worsening in countries once considered to be the region’s 
trailblazers of ‘good governance’: 
 
 ‘High-profile anti-corruption cases and scandals continue 
to be regularly reported in countries including South 
Africa, Ghana and Senegal and risk undermining political 
stability as well as the governments’ capacity to provide 
effective basic services in sectors such as education, 
health and water. In such a context, corruption levels can 
mean the difference between life and death’ 
(Transparency International, 2009). 
 
Many of the region’s gold producers have instituted 
policies and programs to deal specifically with the issue 
of corruption, but with minimal effect. For example, in 
Ghana, which is often championed as a beacon of hope 
in sub-Saharan Africa with its recent track record of ‘free 
and fair’ elections, a ‘zero tolerance policy’ on corruption 
was implemented under the previous president, John 
Kufuor. The move, however, proved futile, in the end 
illustrating how deeply engrained corruption is in the 
country. A recent study commission by UNECA (2002) 
revealed the extent of this corruption. It pointed out how 
evasions, abuse and misapplication of exemption laws 
constitute the bane of Ghana’s tax collection system. It 
furthermore argued that the country has weak ministerial, 
parliamentary and public oversight; incompetent and 
weak governing boards; and is characterized by 
excessive political interference. According to Agyeman-
Duah (2007), Ghana’s political system, which features 
entrenched ‘executive dominance’, breeds corruption: 
because, in accordance with Article 78 of the constitution, 
the president  must  appoint  the  majority  of  his  cabinet  
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the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the perceived level of public-
sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. The country 
with the lowest score is the one where corruption is perceived to be greatest 
among those included in the list. 




from parliament, parliamentarians who are also ministers 
find it difficult to balance loyalties to parliament and the 
executive. Consequently, the author reports, potentially 
powerful committees such as public accounts and finance 
‘stay timid in their duty to scrutinize executive power, 
actions and assurances’. 
With the governments of Ghana and the regimes of 
many other major gold producers in sub-Saharan Africa 
providing minimal support to communities and generally 
not using mine revenues earmarked for community 
development for their intended purpose, companies find 
themselves in positions to effectively self-regulate. 
Quoting Banerjee (2001), Hamann (2003) points this out, 
explaining that the industry’s propensity to operate in 
remote, relatively unmonitored areas often leads to a 
situation where ‘the mining company becomes a sort of 
de facto government’. In addition to Ghana, this appears 
to be the case in Mali, where ‘mining codes have become 
increasingly economically and financially attractive, [but 
where] the social and environmental dimensions have 
followed the opposite trajectory, calling for greater 
responsibility by the mining companies’ (Belem, 2009). 
To their credit, many gold mining companies have 
responded fairly proactively in the absence of regulation, 
‘bridging the gap’ by instituting robust policies and 
programs. But their reluctance to help foster the 
implementation of a credible third party, such as an NGO, 
to regulate their activities in environments lacking 
government enforcement is somewhat disconcerting. The 
industry’s solution to the cyanide management challenge 
at gold mines, for example, was to develop the Interna-
tional Cyanide Management Code, ‘an industry voluntary 
program for gold mining companies... (that) focuses 
exclusively on the safe management of cyanide and 
cyanidation mill tailings and leach solutions’.10 Officers 
from the International Council on Metals and the 
Environment (ICME), a mining industry body, and United 
Nations Environmental Program helped design the code, 
although mining companies provided the greatest share 
of input. At present, 21 mining companies are signatory 
to the code but the initiative is not nearly as thorough as 
is often portrayed: it fails to include all of the activities that 
raise issues of security with cyanide, does not cover the 
environmental consequences of its usage during the 
design and construction of storage systems for industrial 
residues, and overlooks the long term effects of the 
closure or the rehabilitation of the mine site itself (Belem, 
2009). This could explain why, despite the fanfare 
surrounding the code, cyanide spills continue to occur 
quite frequently across sub-Saharan Africa, leading many 
NGOs to openly question its effectiveness.11 Even some 
of  the  signatories  have  allegedly  attempted   to   avoid 
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11
 ‘Ahafo mine cyanide spill prompts NGOs to question Intl. Cyanide Code 
validity’. 
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paying fines and cleanup costs when spills have taken 
place.12  
But it is the way in which mining companies have to 
come manage, institutionally, voluntary initiatives such as 
the International Cyanide Management Code that truly 
underscores how few regulatory responsibilities are 
exercised by African governments. In response to 
growing concern over the legislative implications of multi-
national corporations’ scramble for minerals in developing 
countries, the ICME broadened its mandate in 2001, 
when it became the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM). Its reorganization was a direct response 
to recommendations made under the Global Mining 
Initiative (GMI), a corporate-led program aimed at identi-
fying ways in which the mining sector could operate more 
sustainably (Solomon et al., 2008). It now serves as a 
mouthpiece for the mining sector, bringing together 19 
mining companies and 30 national/regional mining and 
global commodity associations. The role of the ICMM has 
thus far failed to attract substantive discussion in the 
literature, although that which has been produced 
underscores how divergent perspectives on the issue of 
CSR in the mining sector are. Dashwood (2005, 2007a, 
b) is one of the biggest champions of the ICMM and the 
role it has played in facilitating the implementation of 
‘best practice’ in the mining sector. Lost in all of this 
praise, however, is the reality of what the ICMM is: an 
organization established and solely financed by the 
sector’s members, and which operates insularly. These 
points, discussed at some length by Sethi (2005), and 
Sethi and Emelianova (2006), require some clarification. 
The first contentious point that Dashwood (2007b) 
raises relates to the ICMM enabling the mining industry to 
formulate sustainable development standards – that 
‘through the ICMM, mining companies have put forward 
principles of sustainable development against which 
mining companies can be judged’ (Dashwood, 2007a). 
The author argues that ‘the dissemination of global norms 
of corporate social responsibility is best conceptualized 
as a dynamic process, where [mining] multinationals are 
playing a central role, often in conjunction with NGOs and 
states... (and that) through these efforts, global norms 
have not simply filtered down, but have also been shaped 
by companies themselves, in an interactive or dynamic 
process’ (Dashwood, 2007b). This decision-making 
process, however, is far from interactive. As Sethi (2005) 
explains, the way in which the ICMM and its members 
function is more reminiscent of ‘industry-based trade 
associations, which are formed to protect industry 
members’ interests in their traditional business activities’. 
There is no formal process to include external actors in 
the     decision-making     process   and   its   governance 
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structure (Sethi and Emelianova, 2006). 
This raises a second concern – namely, the social 
standards being championed by the industry, through the 
ICMM, itself. Dashwood (2005) notes that ‘the ICMM has 
served as the institutional nucleus for coordinating a 
number of initiatives, including the publication of the 
ICMM principles in May 2003’, and that ‘what is 
significant about the ICMM’s activities are the growing 
web of links with INGOs for the promotion of sustainable 
development in the mining sector’. But the afore-
mentioned initiative attracted significant criticism from 
numerous NGOs, which ‘accused the industry with creat-
ing an organization that is effectively controlled by the 
industry...– [that] the SD framework defined the issues 
from the perspective of the industry and offered solutions 
advocated by the industry’ (Sethi and Emelianova, 2006). 
As further pointed out by Sethi (2005), the principles 
appear ‘inspirational in character’, with heavy emphasis 
on ‘intent’ and ‘commitment’ by member companies, 
therefore falling well short of ‘delivering specific actions 
and desired outcomes’. This is significant when dealing 
with CSR-related issues, particularly concerns which 
affect communities. The ICMM has in place a mission 
statement on ‘Mining and Indigenous Peoples’,13 which 
states the following: 
 
‘ICMM’s vision is for constructive relationships between 
the mining and metals industry and Indigenous Peoples 
which are based on respect, meaningful engagement and 
mutual benefit, and which have particular regard for the 
specific and historical situation of Indigenous Peoples. 
With this statement, ICMM members are making explicit 
a number of their commitments in this area...’  
 
By establishing the ICMM, the mining sector has, in 
effect, become its own champion in the area of CSR. This 
is not to say that, in the absence of regulation and 
enforcement, the management of gold mines in sub-
Saharan Africa is necessarily shying away from providing 
support to catchment communities. But demanding that 
constituents of the mining sector – or from any industry, 
for that matter – regulates and enforce themselves 
through a vehicle such as ICMM may not be the most 
effective approach. As witnessed with cyanide conta-
mination, with weak and corrupt institutional structures 
that fail  to  hold  industries  accountable,  the  onus  rests 
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 ICMM’s Mission Statement on ‘Mining and Indigenous Peoples’, see 
http://www.indigenouspeoplesissues.com/attachments/3016_ICMM_PositionSt
atement.pdf. Its six guiding principles are as follows: 1) Respect the rights and 
interests of Indigenous Peoples as defined within applicable national and 
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on programs to generate net benefits (social, economic, environmental and 
cultural) for affected indigenous communities. 5) Develop good practice 
guidance to support members in implementing the Position Statement. 6) 
Participate in national and international forums on Indigenous Peoples issues, 




largely on the company itself to deal with a problem, 
should it occur.  
Here, the paper has questioned the legitimacy of the 
case being made in support of CSR in the gold mining 
industry, contesting that the main arguments under-                                                                                                                                                  
pinning it have limited application in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The region is rife with corruption and its governments 
place minimal demands on gold mining companies to be 
proactive in the areas of environmental protection and 
community development. As is highlighted further, this is 
potentially a major concern for communities inhabiting the 
catchment regions of mines that come under the 
management of other multinational corporations. New 
ownership is by no means obliged to honour the pledges 
made by previous management to communities. With 
very little to gain financially from doing so, companies 
often implement their own agendas, with little guidance 
from regulators.  
 
 
‘INHERITED’ CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AT AFRICAN GOLD MINES: AN OVERVIEW  
 
The thirst for foreign investment across the developing 
world, particularly in the extractive industries, is fuelling a 
‘race to the bottom’. In the face of stiff competition from 
other states, many developing countries have systema-
tically ‘relaxed’ their environmental and social standards, 
as well as implemented a series of generous economic 
incentives, in order to attract investment and/or retain 
existing industries (Pegg, 2006a, b; Belem, 2009). Whilst 
many executives have been quick to deny that a ‘race to 
the bottom’ is, in fact, taking place, and downplay its 
overall influence on decisions concerning the locating of 
projects, the industry’s current development trajectory 
suggests otherwise: as already noted, today, close to 80 
percent of gold mining activities are found in developing 
countries (EARTHWORKS, 2003).  
Over the past two decades, many multinational gold 
mining companies have established and/or expanded 
operations in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, lured to 
the likes of Ghana, Tanzania, Mali and Mozambique by a 
host of generous investment incentives. In Tanzania, for 
example, up until only recently, foreign gold mining 
companies were permitted to repatriate 100 percent of 
their profits (Lange, 2006). In Mali and Burkina Faso, a 
low royalty of 3 percent – a figure which has quickly 
become the norm across sub-Saharan Africa – is applied 
to production (Campbell, 2003; Forster and Bills, 2003). 
The amount of investment the region has attracted since 
the late-1980s to develop the sector has been unprece-
dented, as has the resulting growth in gold mining and 
exploration activity. Revamped mineral legislation and 
investment frameworks have, inter alia, stimulated a 700 
percent rise in gold production in Ghana; been 
responsible for a doubling of gold output in Mali over the 
past decade; and fuelled an exploration ‘boom’ in   
Uganda, where activity   is   expanding   by 10% annually 




(Aryee, 2001; Government of Uganda, 2006; Belem, 
2009). Figure 1 provides an overview of the gold mining 
landscape in sub-Saharan African Africa.  
But it seems that as quickly as a gold mine is 
established in sub-Saharan Africa, it comes under the
control of new ownership. Whilst takeovers and mergers 
are not alien to any industry, with mines, over a period of 
a decade, five changes in project ownership is not 
uncommon. As Table 2 illustrates, over the past two 
decades, there have been a number of rather unprece-
dented mergers in the gold mining industry in particular, 
many of which have had a profound impact in sub-
Saharan Africa.14 New management bring new ideas and 
often implement radically different policies. With little 
evidence to suggest that CSR – at least in the conven-
tional sense – applies to gold mining, it has become 
nearly impossible to forecast what a company operating 
in sub-Saharan Africa will do following a merger or 
acquisition.  
The issue which this section of the paper aims to 
highlight is how a change in ownership can potentially 
convolute extant commitments to CSR and/or sideline the 
programs a project has in place with catchment commu-
nities. As will be illustrated using a case study of Ghana, 
Africa’s second largest gold producer, following a number 
of acquisitions and mergers, a gold mine’s policies on 
CSR and stewardship can, in fact, change – and often, 
quite radically. The ease with which Ghana’s gold miners 
have been able to make major changes in areas such as 
community development, the environment and employ-
ment reaffirms some of the concerns raised in the 
previous section about the tangibility of the arguments 
underpinning the case for CSR in the extractive Indus-
tries, and gold mining more specifically. On a positive 
note, some of the more progressive gold mining 
companies that have acquired projects and exploration 
‘rights’ in sub-Saharan Africa have upheld many of the 
commitments made by previous management, often 
using existing policies as a foundation to develop more 
comprehensive programs. But other companies have 
elected to ignore ‘inherited’ commitments completely, 
choosing to implement what are arguably more regres-
sive community development programs and CSR 
policies. The problem in Ghana, despite being one of 
Africa’s most democratic and peaceful countries, is that 
there is no real need for gold mining companies to remain 
committed to the pledges they ‘inherit’: here, governance 
is low, regulatory enforcement is questionable and 
corruption is rampant.  
Regardless of location, when a company’s industrial 
activities come under new ownership, changes are 
inevitable:   labour   forces  are  restructured;  downsizing  
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of necessity, at a time when the price of gold had plummeted considerably. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the price of gold hovered around US$300, 
compared to its price of over US$1000 today. 






Figure 1. An overview of gold mining in sub-Saharan Africa (sources: Aryee, 2001; Government of Uganda, 2006; Carstens and 
Hilson, 2009; Belem, 2009).  




Table 2. Selected mergers and acquisitions in the gold mining industry, 1995 to present. 
 
Merger/acquisition Year Details 
Barrick Gold Ltd. and Sutton 
Resources Ltd. 
1999 Barrick acquired Sutton Resources for US$ 350 million in 1999. Sutton 
was principal owner of the Bulyanhulu project in Tanzania. 
   
Barrick Gold Ltd. and Homestake 
Mining Company 
2002 Barrick acquired Homestake, then one of the largest and oldest US 
mining companies, for US$ 2.3 billion in 2002. 
   
Barrick Gold Ltd. and Placer 
Dome Inc. 
2006 Barrick acquired Placer Dome in 2006 for US$ 10.4 billion. Among the 
significant properties it inherited was the North Mara Mine in Tanzania. 
   
Kinross Gold Corporation, TVX 
Gold Inc. and Echo Bay Mines 
Ltd. 
2002 All three companies became one corporation, Kinross Gold, in a 
US$1.95 billion merger. 
   
AngloGold and Ashanti Goldfields 2004 AngloGold acquired Ashanti Goldfields for US$ 1.5 billion. The new 
company, ‘AngloGold Ashanti’, has major operations in Ghana, 
Tanzania, Guinea and the DRC. 
   
Newmont Gold Mining and 
Normandy 
2002 Newmont acquired Australian-headquartered Normandy in 2002. 
Normandy was Australia’s largest mining company at the time. Newmont 
outbid AngloGold, acquiring US$ 4.65 billion of Normandy’s shares.  
   
Gold Fields and Glencar 
Resources 
2009 Gold Fields acquired Glencar for US$42 million in 2009. Glencar had 





often takes place; and machinery is replaced outright. 
These changes are made by management who, mindful 
of the purpose of doing business, is looking to reduce 
costs and maximize profits. Mergers in the mining 
industry almost always result in a shedding of personnel, 
including machine operators, drivers, and unskilled and 
semi-skilled labourers, many of whom are under contract. 
There is no convincing argument which would suggest 
that ‘inherited’ commitments to CSR, which are rarely 
bound by written agreement, stand a better chance of 
being upheld following a merger or acquisition.  
This raises a more important question: if, following a 
takeover, a mining company does not honour the other 
agreements in place with the staff it has absorbed, why 
would its managers feel obligated to continue upholding 
what are no more than verbal agreements with catchment 
communities? Some scholars would argue for the 
reasons identified above – that there is a business case 
in doing so, a need to secure and honour a ‘social license 
to operate’, and because of accountability. But as was 
shown in the previous section of the paper, there is no 
credible foundation on which to base these arguments. 
The ease with which the management of so many newly-
acquired gold mines has pursued an entirely different 
course when it has come to CSR, often in the face of stiff 
community resistance, illustrates, at least in the context 
of sub-Saharan Africa, how anecdotal these arguments 
are. The merging of two gold mining companies can 
entail the fusing of radically different corporate cultures; 
in cases where an acquisition has occurred outright, a 
new corporate strategy is often superimposed. The 
implications these changes have for CSR outcomes, 




THE CASE OF GHANA 
 
Perhaps the most telling indication that gold mining 
companies are doing very little to inform local 
communities about key changes to management is the 
continued blame placed by local people on new 
ownership for incidents that occurred under previous 
directorships. In fact, acquisitions and mergers in the 
sector have often occurred so quickly that even media 
outlets have failed to take stock of the resulting overhaul 
in management and corporate strategy. In Ghana, NGOs 
are still calling for officials at AngloGold Ashanti to be 
prosecuted over an incident that took place in 2003: it is 
alleged that guard dogs were being used to torture 
people caught encroaching on the company’s concession 
in Obuasi.15 But this took place – if at all – under the 
leadership   of    then-CEO    Sam    Jonah,     who     was  
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relinquished of his post following AngloGold’s takeover of 
Ashanti Goldfields in 2006. Should new management be 
held responsible for atrocities that took place in the past, 
often under a completely different regime? Part of the 
reason why there continues to be calls for new manage-
ment of gold mines to do so in not only Ghana but 
throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa is that commu-
nities are simply unaware of acquisitions and mergers. 
For example, many residents of the Tarkwa locality 
continue to refer to the company operating the Damang 
Mine as ‘AGL’ (an acronym for Abosso Goldfields 
Limited), even though the company was acquired by Gold 
Fields in 2002. Residents continue to recall events that 
took place under the management of Abosso and request 
that the company honour the commitments made by its 
predecessor, seemingly oblivious that the mine is now 
under new ownership. 
Walking around the Damang and Tarkwa localities of 
Ghana, it is not surprising that communities are unclear 
about issues of ownership and responsibility. There are 
placards, posters and signs displaying the insignias of the 
current operators – Gold Fields and AngloGold Ashanti – 
of the mines in these areas, as well as remnants of past 
ownership, including old billboards and posters. Over the 
past 20 years, in addition to Gold Fields and AngloGold 
Ashanti, the names ‘State Gold Mining Corporation’, 
‘IAMGOLD’, Ghana Australian Goldfields or ‘GAG’, 
‘Abosso Goldfields’ or ‘AGL’, ‘Pioneer’, ‘Ranger’ and 
‘Teberebie’ have all been linked in some way to the 
ownership of the Damang and Tarkwa mines – a 
turbulent cycle of acquisitions which even policymakers 
are unlikely able to recount. As Botin (2009) explains, the 
Damang mine, which is situated on a 50 km2 concession 
approximately 30 km from the town of Tarkwa, was 
originally built and operated by Ranger Minerals Limited. 
It was acquired by Abosso Goldfields Limited, a company 
which again is 100 percent owned by Gold Fields, in 
2002. Today, Gold Fields retains a 71.9 percent majority 
share in the mine. 
The changes in ownership at Damang, however, dwarf 
in comparison to what has unfolded at the Tarkwa mine. 
Botin (2009) also provides a detailed history of what has 
taken place in Tarkwa over the past 20 years. Today, 
Gold Fields Ghana, which owns 100 percent of the 
Tarkwa project, is 70 percent held by Gold Fields 
Limited16. It acquired the Tarkwa project from the State 
Gold Mining Company in 1993, when it was an under-
ground operation. It continued to function until 1999, 
when operations were suspended on the grounds that the 
project had become unviable. On 25 August 2000, 
however, the Ashanti Goldfields Company Limited (now 
AngloGold Ashanti) sold some of the assets of the 
adjacent Teberebie mine – including the north pit, a 
gyratory   crusher  and  associated  equipment –  to  Gold 
 
 
                                                            





Fields for US$ 5 million.17 Ashanti Goldfields had taken 
control of Teberebie through Ghana Australian Goldfields 
Limited, a company that it majority owned.18 Importantly, 
with the acquisition of these assets, Gold Fields was able 
to resume activities using open pit methods, which 
required resettling over 20,000 villagers and farmers.19 
Dynamic changes in project ownership have occurred 
in all corners of Ghana’s gold-rich territory, in many cases 
without informing catchment communities. As one of the 
busiest gold mining landscapes in sub-Saharan Africa, 
acquisitions of both exploration and mining rights take 
place all of the time, which has enormous implications for 
CSR and community development. In 2001, it was 
reported that there were 237 companies exploring for 
and/or mining gold in Ghana (Aryee, 2001). As of June 
2010, there were 435 active licenses, 57 of which were 
mining leases. Approximately 12 percent of Ghana’s land 
is currently under concession to mining and mineral 
exploration companies. This includes 10 active gold 
mines, all of which are located in the south of the country. 
Most of the country’s major operators have expanded 
their activities in Ghana through acquisitions: in addition 
to Gold Fields, Newmont Gold Mining, which has a 
project in Kenyase in the Brong-Ahafo Region, its 
development facilitated by its acquisition of Normandy 
Mining, a company that had long been engaged in explo-
ratory work in the country; and Golden Star Resources 
Limited, which acquired 90 percent of Bogoso Gold Ltd. 
in 1999. Both Newmont and Golden Star Resources have 
since established extremely profitable projects but on the 
back of very different CSR and community development 
agendas to those ‘inherited’. The following analysis 
reinforces concerns raised earlier in this paper: in Ghana, 
the ease with which gold mining companies have had 
with implementing their own CSR policies suggests that 
there is minimal pressure to implement comprehensive 
programs and be proactive, let alone honour commit-
ments made by previous management to community 
development and environmental protection. 
In 2002, Newmont Mining Corporation acquired 
Normandy Mining, an Australian-headquartered company 
which, at the time of takeover, had carried out consider-
able exploratory work in Ghana. At the time, Normandy’s 
CSR program was in an embryonic state, something 
which Newmont sought to change. As was briefly 
explained in the previous section of the paper, Newmont 
has used Ghana as a platform for a ‘new beginning’ in 
the area of CSR. During the build-up to the much-
anticipated opening of its Ahafo project, Newmont 
management worked exhaustively to sensitize commu-
nities on the  ground  and  empower  subsistence  groups 
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destined to be displaced. As explained at the time by 
Mawuena Dumor, the-then communications manager of 
Newmont Ghana: 
 
‘This is in order to ensure that we do not encounter 
problems that other mining companies have encountered 
when we do start pouring gold in 2006...We [Newmont] 
are currently holding stakeholder consultations with the 
communities, their chiefs and elders and the people 
themselves and finding ways of providing them with 
sustainable alternative livelihoods’.20  
 
Why has Newmont elected to implement such a compre-
hensive CSR project at its Ahafo project? Management 
has cited similar reasons to those highlighted in this 
paper, including that there is a business case for doing so 
and the need for a social license to operate – messages 
which are found throughout the Newmont website. 
The view here, however, is that the decision by 
Newmont to implement a fairly comprehensive CSR 
agenda is less about there being a need to do so and 
more to do with an unfamiliarity with the dynamics of 
doing business in sub-Saharan Africa. Being its first 
significant project in the region, it appears that manage-
ment has elected to take a more cautious approach to 
environmental and social issues than those pursued at 
the company’s projects in Peru and Indonesia. In many 
ways, Newmont has been its own champion, using 
various media outlets to publicize its intentions on being a 
good citizen and starting fresh in Ghana. The Ahafo 
mine, which at the time of its opening, had close to 12 
million oz of proven gold reserves, processes ore from 
seven major pits (four in the south and three in the north) 
that extend along a 40 km strike. Its rate of production is 
in the range of 500,000 oz of gold/year (Mitchell and 
Jorgensen, 2007). This, however, was only made possi-
ble by a comprehensive relocation exercise, which 
involved the resettlement of close to 10,000 farmers and 
their families. Few resettlements go according to plan, 
but to their credit, Newmont officials agreed to award 
compensation packages based on sums much higher 
than the highly-outdated figures used by the government. 
Working with a local NGO, ‘Guards of the Earth and the 
Vulnerable’, a Resettlement Negotiation Committee com-
posed of democratically-elected facilitators was formed. 
The resulting negotiations spearheaded by the NGO 
yielded a compensation agreement amounting to 103 
percent more than the original figure.21 A commitment to 
its program would help the company achieve record 
levels of production (513,470 oz of gold) at Ahafo in 
2009.22 
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Newmont has since been fairly responsive to other issues 
as well. For example, in April 2010, the company agreed 
to pay close to US$ 4.8 million to cover damages caused 
by a cyanide23 spill at the Ahafo Mine in October 2009.24 
Whilst Newmont should be held responsible for these 
costs, its decision to dispense of these monies rather 
quickly was nevertheless significant, given the way, 
historically, mining companies have responded to 
cyanide spillage: there is a long list of companies ope-
rating in developing countries that have successfully 
manoeuvred their way out of paying for cleanup following 
an accident. Another rather commendable move was the 
company’s decision to dismiss its Head of Security at 
Ahafo in 2007, after he allegedly referred to some of his 
workers as ‘black monkeys’. This caused significant 
agitation in Ahafo’s communities, leading the chiefs and 
youth to demonstrate and call for his removal. Newmont 
officials, which had spent several years building positive 
relations with the residents of Ahafo’s catchment 
communities, particularly their traditional leaders, had no 
choice but to sack and summarily deport its head of 
security.25  
But Newmont’s effort could be viewed differently: as a 
CSR program that appears to be comprehensive but 
which, in reality, the public knows very little about. The 
company has been cleverly using the media since its 
takeover of Normandy to project a positive image about 
its intentions and CSR strategy in the public domain. It 
uses the Ghana’s Daily Graphic, Ghanaian Times and 
Accra Daily, Ghana’s main state-owned newspapers to 
keep the public abreast of CSR at Ahafo, although the 
effort has increasingly become more propaganda-like. 
Moreover, it has established a website, ‘Beyond the 
mine: The journey towards sustainability’, on which its 
management details what it views as concrete examples 
of ‘best practice’ at its mines worldwide, including 
experiences from Ahafo.  
The concern here is not necessarily with what 
Newmont officials have created but rather the autonomy 
they have been given to develop polices: its CSR 
program may, indeed, be robust but it was developed 
without much outside guidance and its impact, as will be 
explained, is virtually unverifiable. Management has 
solicited the inputs of NGOs such as Guards of the Earth 
and the Vulnerable and OICI to assist with the design of 
its CSR program at Ahafo but why has the government 
not provided any additional guidance on this front? Unlike 
many other gold mining territories in sub-Saharan Africa, 
in the Ahafo locality, there was no legacy of CSR. 
Newmont simply formulated a program, drawing heavily 
upon wider ICMM principles and staff expertise, to 
implement what  appears  to  be  an  extremely   complex 
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community relations management structure. When it 
came time for resettling farmers or when cyanide was 
spilled, criticisms from local NGOs such as the Wassa 
West Association of Communities Affected by Mining 
(WACAM) were seen by the public as baseless and 
complaints from the community heavily suppressed, in 
large part because of the success of the company in 
projecting itself, through the media, as a responsible 
citizen.  
Attempts made to monitor what has become a very 
fortified CSR program at Ahafo, unaffected by criticism, 
have been in vain. One of the most unexplained events 
was the arrest of OXFAM International’s West Africa 
Program Officer at Yamfo. On 30 November 2006, Mr 
Ibrahima Aidiara and six others were apprehended by 
local police, the Brong Ahafo Regional Police Com-
mander alleging that ‘they planned to incite the people in 
the town to revolt against Newmont gold mining 
operations there’.26 It was further explained that the 
seven, who remained in detention until 11 December 
2006,27 were arrested on the grounds that they had not 
informed the police of the event beforehand. Although 
company officials denied any knowledge of the incident, it 
does raise the question of why the police would act in 
such a manner unless under specific instruction to do so. 
In response to the arrest, Newmont declared that it: 
 
‘...expresses concern and confusion regarding these 
developments. The company is continuing its commit-
ment to understand the circumstances which have 
resulted in this outcome. Newmont only last week (Friday 
November 24, 2006) participated in a meeting with 
members of WACAM and OXFAM in Accra at their 
request and to the company’s mutual satisfaction. 
Newmont, WACAM and OXFAM agreed to meet at the 
Newmont mine site at Ahafo today (November 28) to 
further discuss issues of mutual interest and concern. It is 
regrettable that WACAM and OXFAM decided to boycott 
the scheduled meeting of November 28 following the 
incident at Yamfo’.28 
 
Despite claiming otherwise, it is rather unlikely that 
Newmont officials had little knowledge of the arrest or 
any other event for that matter that takes place on a 
concession housing billions of dollars in investment. The 
company’s rather ambiguous response has done little to 
quell accusations made by NGOs that its management is 
bribing police.29 Of particular concern is the lack of 
government response to the incident; there have been no 
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calls for Newmont to have its community development 
program thoroughly subjected to monitoring by outside 
sources. This further reinforces the concerns raised 
earlier in this paper regarding the lack of monitoring and 
regulatory inputs in African settings.  
Whilst the event looks rather suspicious, a likely reason 
behind Newmont shielding such ‘uncontrolled’ 
inspections and visits is its need to appease the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which has 
provided significant financial assistance for the project. 
The IFC, which is faced with pressures of its own, the 
most significant being those emanating from a 
consortium of neighbouring Washington DC-based 
NGOs, has responded to outside criticisms of its 
investments by demanding that borrowers like Newmont 
ensure that their projects adhere to certain environmental 
and social standards. Perhaps allowing outside 
inspection could have run the risk of revealing potentially 
damaging findings. In sum, despite not inheriting any 
legacy from Normandy, Newmont Ghana has managed 
to decide, relatively autonomously, what development 
trajectory it will follow. It continues to operate a rather 
insular CSR program which may or may not be making a 
difference. Its approach has proved effective under the 
circumstances, however, netting the company record 
levels of production and profits. 
Golden Star Resources, on the other hand, has not 
been anywhere near as proactive as Newmont on the 
CSR front but has nevertheless achieved similar success 
economically. Unlike Newmont, the Denver-based 
company did move into an area where there was a 
legacy of CSR and firm commitments in place with the 
community. As already explained, its move to Ghana was 
facilitated by its acquisition of a 90 percent share in 
Bogoso Gold Ltd. (BGL) in 2004 (Hilson and Yakovleva, 
2007). Golden Star Resources owns the 145 km2 Bogoso 
concession and the surface rights to the adjoining 129 
km2 Prestea concession. The acquisition of Prestea was 
facilitated by a joint venture made in 2002 between BGL, 
the-then State Gold Mining Company, the Ghana Mine 
Workers Union and Prestea Gold Resources. The latter 
was assembled by former employees of the State Gold 
Mining Company, in 1998. It was a last-ditch attempt to 
save the floundering underground workings in Prestea 
but which, after incurring in excess of US$ 6 million in 
losses over the period 1999-2001, management was 
forced to close. As part of the agreement made in 2002, 
BGL management committed to providing US$ 2.4 million 
to cover the salaries and debts owed by Prestea Gold 
Resources, as well as to assess the feasibility of the 
underground project. 
As noted, in BGL, Golden Star Resources took over a 
company whose management had forged good relations 
with the community. It supplied the residents of Prestea 
with electricity and water free of charge. It even signed a 
contract with former employees of Prestea Gold 
Resources, ‘permitting’ them to mine artisanal workings 




concession – a move made to help alleviate the hardship 
created by the closure of underground activities. 
Relations were so cordial that the Prestea community 
renamed the town’s park to ‘Neil Stevenson Park’ as a 
token of appreciation to the-then BGL manager for all of 
his efforts.  
All of this changed, however, following the takeover. 
With no requirement or expectation on the part of the 
government to build upon the foundation of CSR 
established by its predecessor, new management elected 
not to honour any of the commitments already in place, 
and did so without penalty. Some would say that it proved 
to be a public relations nightmare but this approach has 
never adversely impacted the profitability of Golden Star 
Resources, nor did it impede its entry to Ghana: the 
government seemed to welcome the company despite its 
questionable track record, highlighted by its refusal to 
compensate local residents following a cyanide spill at 
the Omai Gold Mine (in which it held a 30 percent stake) 
in Guyana. Its management contested at the time that 
such accidents ‘are one of the many risks of doing 
business’ (Garvey and Newell, 2005). It seemed that from 
the beginning, management had no qualms about 
alienating the Prestea and Bogoso communities.  
First, management stopped financing electricity and 
water service for residents, and called in the military to 
remove miners from the ‘Number Four Bungalow’ site, 
despite having very little interest in mining the area. A 
decision was then made to carry out blasting without 
notifying communities (Ghana had no noise pollution 
standards at the time), which residents claimed caused 
damages to their houses and structures. There was also 
an incident in the town of Dumasi, where water used for 
cooking was turning purple because of contamination 
from mine drainage. The company now transports large 
canisters of drinking water to the town every week. Local 
NGOs have encouraged communities to protest against 
the company and the government. The ‘Concerned 
Citizens of Prestea’ was formed shortly after the takeover 
but every peaceful protest it has since organized has 
resulted in shootings or casualties.30 The company even 
hired Newmont’s former Director of Security, who again, 
was deported from the country by Newmont following the 
incident at Ahafo, as its own Head of Security, prompting 
further outcry from local NGOs.31 But complaints of 
Golden Star Resources and its rather unique approach to 
community development have not prevented it from 
mining profitably: the company projected gold production 
to be in the range of 200,000 oz in 2010. Moreover, the 
radical departure in approach from the pre-existing CSR 
program of BGL and the mounting grievances it has 
brought has not prevented the company from acquiring 
contiguous   concessions   in  Wassa  Akropong,  another 
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(adjacent) district in Ghana. 
To summarize, Newmont and Golden Star Resources 
have approached their situations rather differently. This 
analysis does not advocate either as a ‘best practice’. It 
has rather sought to underscore how a wide range of 
approaches to CSR can be taken in Ghana’s gold mining 
sector. These case studies bring to light some of the 
concerns raised earlier in the paper over issues on which 
proponents of CSR engaged in not only gold mining in 
developing countries but the extractive industries more 
generally base their arguments. Newmont and Golden 
Star Resources have been able to implement radically 
different CSR programs to those of the companies they 
acquired because there is minimal pressure to implement 
comprehensive environmental protection and community 
development programs, and, perhaps most importantly, 
to honour the pledges made by the management of 
projects acquired. Gold mining companies with poor 
environmental and community development track records 
have been able to readily establish themselves in Ghana 
and a number of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
With no evidence to suggest that being proactive on the 
CSR front in the industry results in financial gain, it has 
become almost impossible – at least in the case of sub-






This paper has drawn attention to the issue of ‘inherited 
CSR’ in the context of the extractive industries, focusing 
specifically on the case of gold mining in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Throughout the region, it has become exceedingly 
difficult to predict how new ownership will approach the 
interrelated challenges of environmental protection and 
community development following a takeover of a gold 
mine. The arrival of new management results in a fusion 
of corporate cultures, which, in turn, can lead to the 
setting of – often radically – different goals and the 
implementation of new programs. Surprisingly, little 
research has been undertaken to determine the impact a 
merger or outright takeover of a company has on CSR 
strategy at a mine, including the fate of commitments 
made by previous management. New management no 
doubt handles these pledges much in the same way that 
it would issues such as staffing and operations. The key 
difference and concern with CSR, however, is that unlike 
staff or suppliers, who are often under contract, commit-
ments to community development and often, environ-
mental protection, are rarely much more than verbal or 
written promises. 
Though virtually overlooked in the literature, the issue 
of ‘inherited CSR’ in the gold mining industry is signify-
cant, particularly for sub-Saharan Africa. As explained in 
this paper, the region is characterized by low trans-
parency and rampant corruption; many of its countries     
are     run     by  governments   that    have systematically 




marginalized populations to stay in power. Is a company 
that is due to operate in such an environment expected to 
honour the agreements forged by its predecessor 
following the takeover of a gold mining project? Propo-
nents argue that for gold mining companies, a firm 
commitment to CSR is necessary in order to maximize 
profits. But as the analysis presented earlier in this paper 
shows, the arguments commonly tabled in support of 
CSR in the gold mining sector are tenuous, particularly in 
the case of sub-Saharan Africa. Understanding the 
limitations of these views helps to explain why, following 
a change in ownership of a gold mine, commitments to 
CSR are often sidelined and/or overhauled completely. 
As was illustrated by the Ghana experience, there does 
not appear to be much pressure on incoming companies 
to honour existing commitments to communities and/or 
the environment, or to even implement CSR programs of 
their own. In fact, and as illustrated by the case studies of 
Newmont and Golden Star Resources, in the absence of 
rules and regulations, new management is at liberty to 
implement policies and programs of their choice.   
The main concern in the case of sub-Saharan Africa is 
that despite the rhetoric, there is no convincing evidence 
to suggest that having in place comprehensive 
environmental policies and protection strategies, as well 
as cutting-edge community development programs, 
increases the profitability of a gold mine. This could 
explain why, for instance, the local economic develop-
ment exercises launched in the catchment areas of mines 
often lose their cohesion so quickly, or why cyanide 
management systems become less effective over time: 
the ownership of a project changes quite frequently, and 
following each handover, aspects of the operation is 
evaluated, re-evaluated and potentially changed. In such 
an economic climate, it would be unrealistic to assume 
that a mine’s stakeholders are seen by management as 
being equal. This is an issue discussed quite extensively 
by Argenti (1998), who acknowledges that ‘companies 
perform better the more closely they engage everyone 
affected by their operations’ but at the same time, 
recognizes that ‘an organization designed to serve more 
than one set of people will fail to satisfy any’. A main 
message which the author attempts to get across is that 
every company values key stakeholder groups differently, 
depending on the circumstances. The key question, 
therefore, becomes: what must a company do in order to 
guarantee a maximum return to its shareholders? In the 
case of gold mines in sub-Saharan Africa, there is no 
reason to believe that communities are anywhere near as 
integral to the financial success of a project as portrayed 
by business leaders. This possibility, along with the 
frequent changes in ownership of the region’s gold mines 
and the marked variations in corporate strategies found 
across the industry, makes an improved understanding of 
how incoming management handles outstanding 
commitments to communities and the environment, as 
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